President Obama once specified that the drone programme mustn’t create more enemies than it would on the (old-fashioned) battlefield. Is it meeting that test? Since the “drone wars” began in 2008, al-Qa’eda’s central command has been devastated, but the group’s offshoots have boomed. Yemen’s government was toppled by Houthi tribesmen angry that the US had turned their country into a “target range”. It’s time for a “top-to-bottom review” of the drone programme – one “focused not only on targeting rules, but also on costs and benefits”. ( part of an article by Doyle McManus, Los Angeles Times)

It seems to me that hardly a week goes by when there hasn’t been a drone mistake. Schools, hospitals, our own men, weddings, funerals all at one point or another have been mistakenly hit. Apologies are forthcoming, but probably never listened to. According to some accounts we have managed to turn the Pakistanis from being, more or less, sympathetic with American efforts to crush the Taliban and Al Qaida into sympathisers with the latter.

The point is that the CIA lost too many of their human “assets” long ago and concentrated on electronic surveillance. Now we are struggling to verify targets. It was inevitable. I remember meeting a senior member of the British secret services, who, in a moment of candour, said it was really stupid to rely on electronics instead of dedicated, trained spies and observers on the ground. Syrians and Afghans, for instance, may well want to help destroy ISIS, but they aren’t stupid; they see Afghans who helped the Americans denied help or visas to get out of the country to safety. Why should anyone spy for American troops? Eyeless in Gaza isn’t in it.